Family Law: Parent and Child by Solender, Ellen K.
SMU Law Review
Volume 41
Issue 1 Annual Survey of Texas Law Article 3
1987
Family Law: Parent and Child
Ellen K. Solender
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ellen K. Solender, Family Law: Parent and Child, 41 Sw L.J. 45 (1987)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol41/iss1/3
FAMILY LAW: PARENT AND CHILD
by
Ellen K. Solender*
I. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
URING the 1985-1986 Term the United States Supreme Court de-
cided one family law case that directly affected Texas law, Reed v.
Campbell. ' The Court, reversing an appeal from a Texas decision,2
held that because the administration of the estate in question was still in
progress at the time of the Court's decision in Trimble v. Gordon,3 properly
resolving the illegitimate child's claim would not affect the state interest in
the orderly disposition of decedents' estates.4 Reed involved an illegitimate
child who claimed a right to share in her father's estate despite the fact that
her parents had never married. Her father died just prior to the decision in
Trimble, and her claim was filed after that decision. Although the jury
found that she was, in fact, her father's child, the trial court denied her
claim, and the appellate court affirmed.5 The Supreme Court refrained from
basing its decision on retroactivity and instead held that the interest in
avoiding unjustified discrimination against children born out of wedlock
should be given controlling effect. 6 The Court reversed and remanded. 7
Justice O'Connor this fall issued a stay in a child support case s that con-
cerned the presumption of ability to comply with a court order. The stay
was issued in connection with a California case wherein an appellate court
held unconstitutional the requirement that the defendant has the burden to
prove he is unable to comply with a child support order.9 When the United
* A.B., Oberlin College; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Professor of Law, South-
ern Methodist University.
1. 106 S. Ct. 2234, 90 L. Ed. 2d 858 (1986).
2. Reed v. Campbell, 682 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For
a discussion of this case, see Solender, Family Law: Parent and Child, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 40 Sw. L.J. 53, 58 (1985).
3. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). In this case the Court held unconstitutional a total statutory
disinheritance from the paternal estate of children born out of wedlock and not legitimated by
the subsequent marriage of their parents. 106 S. Ct. at 2236, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 861-62.
4. 106 S. Ct. at 2337-38, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 861-64.
5. 682 S.W.2d at 701.
6. 106 S. Ct. at 2238, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 862-64. The Court based its reasoning on the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Id.
7. 106 S. Ct. at 2238, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 864. On remand, the El Paso court of appeals
reversed and remanded the trial court's decision. Reed v. Campbell, 719 S.W.2d 655 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1986, no writ) (per curiam).
8. Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 107 S. Ct. 259, 93 L. Ed. 2d 237 (1986).
9. In re Feiock, 180 Cal. App. 3d 649, 653-55, 225 Cal. Rptr. 748, 750-51 (1986), cert.
granted sub nom. Hicks v. Feiock, 55 U.S.L.W. 3607 (Mar. 10, 1987) (No. 86-787).
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States Supreme Court decides this case next year, the holding may be an
extremely important help or detriment to the speedy collection of child sup-
port payments.
II. STATUS
The Texas Supreme Court found the Texas guest statute' ° unconstitu-
tional in Whitworth v. Bynum. 1 This ruling is an important first step for
family lawyers because it may cause a change in the current rule with regard
to intrafamily immunity in negligence cases.12 The court has addressed this
issue with regard to intentional torts,' 3 but not with regard to negligence.
Removing the statutory barrier to suits between family members regarding
automobile accidents should hasten the court's consideration of the issue of
intrafamily negligence.
Complying with the mandate of the federal Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act (EAHCA)' 4 may be expensive. In Alamo Heights In-
dependent School District v. State Board of Education,'5 however, the Court
held that if a handicapped child is likely to regress during a summer hiatus
in educational opportunities, the school district must provide a suitable pro-
gram. 16 Further, the court held that if out-of-district transportation is re-
quired, the district should provide that too.17 In this case the school district
was reluctant to bear the expense; however, the State Commissioner of Edu-
cation ordered the school district to provide the child in question with full
summer services as well as transportation. The court sustained this order,18
but found that the mother was not entitled to attorney's fees because her
child was not denied any due process rights'9 and because EAHCA contains
no provision for attorney's fees.20
In University Interscholastic League v. Jones2' a high school senior was
allowed to play football although ineligible under University Interscholastic
League (UIL) rules because he obtained an injunction that was not over-
turned in time to prevent his playing out the season. The appellate court
then dismissed the case as moot.22 In Eanes Independent School District v.
Logue,23 however, the UIL prevailed because the Texas Supreme Court is-
10. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701b (Vernon 1977).
11. 699 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1985).
12. See Felderhoffv. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 933 (Tex. 1971) (allowing an employee-
son to sue his father's partnership for negligence, but noting that in ordinary negligence situa-
tions a parent-child suit would not be allowed).
13. Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925, 926-27 (Tex. 1977).
14. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-20 (1982).
15. 790 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1986).
16. Id. at 1159.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1160.
19. Id. at 1161-62. Had there been a denial of due process the mother might have been
entitled to attorney's fees under the federal civil rights acts, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
20. 790 F.2d at 161-63.
21. 715 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
22. Id. at 761.
23. 712 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. 1986).
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sued a conditional writ of mandamus ordering the district judge to vacate his
injunction. 24 Logue involved the declaration of a winner in Texas high
school regional baseball play-offs after only one game in a best two-out-of-
three series was played. The remaining two games were delayed because of
rain and the UIL, following its rules, declared that the winner of the one
game could advance in the playoffs. The Texas Supreme Court found that
the district court had abused its discretion when it interfered with the UIL
decision. 25 The court held that there is no fundamental right to participate
in athletic events and therefore no constitutional rights were involved. 26
In Austin v. Hale27 the court held that employees of the Department of
Human Resources are immune from suit for negligence if they act in good
faith in investigating an allegation of child abuse.28 The employees in Austin
received a report of child abuse; while their investigation was in progress the
child was killed. The court found that the gathering of information in order
to take action based on that information was a quasi-judicial function and
thus fell within the scope of official immunity. 29
An adoption must be completely finalized before the about-to-adopt par-
ent can file a wrongful death action. A federal court held in Byrnes v. Ford
Motor Co. 30 that under Texas law the class of beneficiaries under the wrong-
ful death statute 31 is very specific and would not include a surviving about-
to-adopt parent.32 The court did hold, however, that such a parent could
bring a claim under the survival statute,33 since the rights of the child's natu-
ral parents had been terminated and no one other than the about-to-adopt
parent could claim any interest in the estate. 34 The claim, of course, turns
on the establishing of an equitable adoption in the probate court.35
In many cases, paternity is the key to determining the status of a child. A
San Antonio court held in dictum that nothing in the Texas statutes prevents
a paternity action after the death of the putative father. 36 In addition, the
court held that a putative paternal grandparent is not an individual who,
under the Family Code,37 can be ordered to submit to blood tests for the
purposes of establishing paternity.38 Ex Parte Carey39 concerned a father
who sought to avoid responsibility for his child by refusing to submit to
blood tests. A jury found that he was the father, thus rendering the question
24. Id. at 742.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 711 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. App.-Waco 1986, no writ).
28. Id. at 67, 68; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.05 (Vernon 1986).
29. 711 S.W.2d at 68.
30. 642 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Tex. 1986).
31. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.004 (Vernon 1986).
32. 642 F. Supp. at 310-11.
33. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.021 (Vernon 1986).
34. 642 F. Supp. at 311-12.
35. Id. at 311.
36. Manuel v. Spector, 712 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
37. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.01 (Vernon 1986).
38. 712 S.W.2d at 223.
39. 704 S.W.2d 13 (Tex. 1986).
1987]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
of blood tests moot. Prior to the trial, the trial court found him in contempt
and ordered him to pay fines of $5,000 and $25,000. The Texas Supreme
Court held that these fines exceeded the statutory limit4" by $4,500 and
$24,500 respectively, and ordered him discharged upon payment of the
proper statutory fines of $500 each and costs. 4 1
Even dismissal for want of prosecution will not prevent the refiling of a
paternity action, since the dismissal is not on the merits and, therefore, is not
res judicata. 42 The court held further that laches would not bar the suit
since it was to enforce the statutory duty of support43 and also that the stat-
utes of limitation would not bar the action because the child's status as a
minor tolled the statute of limitations.44
III. CONSERVATORSHIP
In Oglesby v. Silcott 4 5 the Texas Supreme Court recognized a common
law cause of action for interference with child custody.46 The court held that
the appellate court had incorrectly interpreted an 188647 case in which the
Texas Supreme Court had recognized a parental cause of action for child
enticement, but had limited damages to the loss of the value of the child's
services during the period of the abduction.48 The court then went on to
apply the more expansive common law right embodied in section 700 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts to the facts of the case. 49 The court stated
that section 700 would apply to cases tried before September 1, 1983.50 The
legislature has enacted both a criminal penalty51 and a civil remedy 52 for
interference with child custody, effective September 1, 1983, but the addi-
tional possibility of a common law remedy might prove useful in the future
should there be a fact situation that does not quite fit under the statutory
causes of action. The court also discussed damages recoverable under this
tort and pointed out that the possible financial benefit from a child is no
longer the sole measure of damages. 53 Damages today include compensation
for loss of companionship and the mental anguish experienced by the parents
during the period of abduction.5 4 If the abduction is willful, then there need
40. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 21.002(b) (Vernon 1986).
41. 704 S.W.2d at 13, 14.
42. Texas Attorney Gen. ex rel. Ford v. Daurbigny, 702 S.W.2d 298, 299-300 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
43. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12.04(3) (Vernon 1986).
44. 702 S.W.2d at 301.
45. 721 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. 1986).
46. Id. at 293.
47. Id. at 292 (discussing Gulf C. & S.F. Ry. v. Redeker, 67 Tex. 190, 2 S.W. 527 (1886)).
48. 721 S.W.2d at 293.
49. Id. at 292. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 700 (1977) states: "One who, with
knowledge that the parent does not consent, abducts or otherwise compels or induces a minor
child to leave a parent legally entitled to its custody or not to return to the parent after it has
been left him, is subject to liability to the parent."
50. 721 S.W.2d at 293.
51. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.03 (Vernon 1974).
52. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 36.01-.08 (Vernon 1986).
53. 721 S.W.2d at 292 (citing Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex. 1983)).
54. Id.
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be no showing of actual physical injury to the parents for the parents to have
a right of recovery. 5
A federal court in Shean v. White 56 decided to abstain provisionally from
deciding a possible civil rights claim pending resolution of the dispute by the
state courts. The case involved allegations of wrongful conduct on the part
of state officials, including some state judges, in the placement of certain
children in foster care. The court found that the defendant judges were ab-
solutely immune and dismissed any actions as to them. 7 The court, in ab-
staining, relied primarily on the domestic relations exception, but also cited
the need to avoid disrupting state efforts to establish a coherent policy.5 8
In a divorce petition a husband filed for managing conservatorship of not
only his own child, but of one that had been born to his former spouse just
prior to the marriage. The trial court granted his request, but the appellate
court reversed59 as to his non-natural child. The court held that in order for
a third party to prevail against a natural parent, as to managing conservator-
ship, the third party must rebut the presumption that it is in the best interest
of the child to appoint the natural parent the managing conservator.60 The
court held that evidence concerning positive benefits will not rebut the pre-
sumption and that the third party must introduce evidence affirmatively
showing a detrimental effect upon the child if the child is placed with the
natural parent.61 In Sharp v. Sharp62 the court granted the mother manag-
ing conservatorship although a family therapist made allegations of sexual
abuse.63 The trial court on somewhat incomplete evidence found the allega-
tions unsupported, and the appellate court affirmed.64 In another contested
conservatorship case the appellate court ordered the trial court to set aside
its order to the husband that he furnish blood and urine samples for labora-
tory analysis.65 The court held that the trial court's order was an abuse of
discretion, since the wife had not made an affirmative showing that the hus-
band's mental or physical condition was in controversy. 66 In Beaupre v.
Beaupre67 the father, possessory conservator, complained that the trial court
55. Id.
56. 620 F. Supp. 1329 (N.D. Tex. 1985).
57. Id. at 1330.
58. Id. at 1331.
59. Neely v. Neely, 698 S.W.2d 758, 760 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ).
60. Id. "A parent shall be appointed managing conservator of the child unless the court
finds that appointment of the parent would not be in the best interest of the child." TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 14.01(b) (Vernon 1986). This same section was relied on in Ex rel. T-, 715
S.W.2d 416, 418 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ), to affirm the granting of managing conser-
vatorship to the child's mother as opposed to the grandmother. In Yevak v. Yevak, 713
S.W.2d 164 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no writ), the question of evidence had not yet
arisen, since the grandparents had been denied the right to intervene. The case was reversed
and remanded. Id. at 166.
61. 698 S.W.2d at 759-60.
62. 710 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
63. Id. at 698.
64. Id.
65. Walsh v. Ferguson, 712 S.W.2d 885, 885-87 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).
66. Id. at 886, 887. Good cause must be shown before an order for a physical examina-
tion can issue. TEX. R. Civ. P. 167a(a).
67. 700 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1985, writ dism'd).
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denied him access to his children because the conservatorship decree pro-
vided for supervised visitation for three months and made no specific provi-
sions for the period thereafter. The appellate court held that although the
Family Code provides that the times and conditions for access must be spe-
cific, 68 if good cause is shown why such specificity would not be in the chil-
dren's best interest, then the possessory conservator has the right of
reasonable visitation. 69 In Vellek v. Vellek 70 a decree that contemplated vis-
itation in Japan was not an abuse of discretion since no extreme grounds
existed to support a denial.7'
Once the terms of conservatorship have been established, they can be
modified only upon a showing of a material and substantial change in cir-
cumstances, that retention of the present managing conservator would be
injurious to the child, and either that the appointment of a new managing
conservator would be a positive improvement or the managing conservator
has voluntarily relinquished possession and control for more than twelve
months and the modification is in the best interest of the child. 72 In recent
years, a number of divorce decrees have included agreed joint conservator-
ships, 73 and after a time one or the other of the parents has attempted to
modify them so as to be appointed the sole managing conservator. 74 Some
of these motions have been successful"7 and some unsuccessful. 76 In Brown
v. Russell,77 the jury found that the conditions of the statute had been met,
but the appellate court reversed and remanded because of the prejudicial
comments of the trial judge. 78 McClain v. Moore79 is especially notable be-
cause a stepfather was not only able to prevail on the question of modifica-
tion, but also, in contrast to the stepfather in Neely, 80 he prevailed on the
issue of the best interest of the child as against the natural mother.8'
68. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03(a) (Vernon 1986).
69. 700 S.W.2d at 355.
70. 709 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
71. Id. at 762.
72. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(c)(1) (Vernon 1986).
73. See infra notes 74-76. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.06(a) (Vernon 1986) provides that
parties may enter into written agreements containing, among other things, provisions for the
appointment of joint managing conservators.
74. For a recent negative review of joint custody arrangements see Baron, Joint Managing
Conservatorship: Why Texas Courts Should Not Permit It, 28 S. TEX. L. REV. 379 (1986).
75. Doyen v. Doyen, 713 S.W.2d 370, 371-72 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, no writ) (rela-
tionship with mother was found to be deteriorating); Randle v. Randle, 700 S.W.2d 314, 316
(Tex. App.-Houston (1st Dist.] 1985, no writ) (modification to avoid constant switching of
child back and forth would be a positive improvement).
76. Whitehead v. Whitehead, 709 S.W.2d 388, 389 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ
dism'd) (per curiam) (no evidence to sustain change of condition, but reversed and remanded
because of evidence that parents would be living in different localities and therefore a change in
the access provisions may be needed); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 707 S.W.2d 724, 725-26 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1986, no writ) (without a finding of a change of conditions a de facto change
of managing conservator is erroneous).
77. 703 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ).
78. Id. at 847-48.
79. 701 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1985, no writ).
80. Neely v. Neely, 698 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ) (per curiam). For
a discussion of this case see supra notes 59 and 60 and accompanying text.
81. 701 S.W.2d at 64.
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Procedural errors can hamper modification attempts, especially if a party
files a motion in the wrong court82 or if the court fails to transfer as required
by the statute.8 3 When there is nothing in the record showing otherwise, the
appellate court will presume that judgment was rendered in accord with a
mutual agreement.8 4 In Stock v. Stock 85 the court held that even if a father
has fled the jurisdiction with his child following the rendering of a joint man-
aging conservatorship decision, this decision cannot be modified after it has
become final by denoting the modification a nunc pro tunc change. 86 In ad-
dition, the court held that a father was entitled to his day in court following
notice by publication of a further modification of the original revised deci-
sion, since he had filed a motion for new trial within the two-year period
permitted by the statute. 87 Finding the original revised order void, the ap-
pellate court ordered both the original revised order and the modification
order set aside and remanded for a new trial.88 Modification cannot be ac-
complished by appealing to the federal courts.8 9
The Texas courts continue to endeavor to comply with the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) 90 and have consistently held that if evi-
dence shows that Texas is not the home state of the child and that another
state has jurisdiction, 91 the decision of the trial court to refuse jurisdiction
will not be overturned. 92 In Grimes v. Grimes93 the court held that when the
court of another state has jurisdiction over one of two siblings and the other
sibling has no home state,94 but substantial evidence is introduced concern-
82. See Ortiz v. Aranda, 716 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986) (modifi-
cation void, because no record of transfer of jurisdiction from the court of exclusive
jurisdiction).
83. See Reed v. Kenyon, 713 S.W.2d 805, 806-08 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1986,
no writ) (mandamus will issue when a timely motion to transfer has been filed and there is no
controverting affidavit). The transfer is a ministerial duty under TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 11.06 (Vernon 1986); see also Lambert v. Baker, 705 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1986, no writ) (per curiam) (mandamus will not issue when the statement of facts
contains conflicting evidence as to the length of time the child has lived in the county).
84. Tevathan v. Akins, 712 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1986, no
writ).
85. 702 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
86. Id. at 716-17.
87. Id. at 714. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329 sets this two-year limitation.
88. 702 S.W.2d at 716-17.
89. See Krempp v. Dobbs, 775 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1985) (affirming the federal district
court refusal to review the result of a state custody proceeding).
90. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.51-.75 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1987).
91. The criteria established to determine whether Texas has jurisdiction is found in id
§ 11.53.
92. See Harkness v. Harkness 709 S.W.2d 376, 378 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1986, writ
dism'd) (upholding trial court's discretion in refusing to file additional facts and conclusions of
law when Texas not home state of child); Mason v. Barton, 705 S.W.2d 284, 286 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio 1986, no writ) (per curiam) (mandamus denied although trial court had granted
Texas mother emergency temporary managing conservatorship, but had also refused jurisdic-
tion because it found that Oregon was the proper forum to decide the custody issue); Porter v.
Johnson, 712 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no writ) (trial court found
that child had not lived in Texas for six months prior to the commencement of the modifica-
tion proceeding and, in addition, a custody proceeding was pending in North Carolina).
93. 706 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ dism'd).
94. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.52 (5) (Vernon 1986) defines the term "home state" as
1987]
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ing the care and protection of that sibling in the other state, a Texas court
should decline jurisdiction.95 The child in Grimes had no home state be-
cause, although the Illinois mother had been appointed managing conserva-
tor, the child had lived in Texas with her maternal grandmother until the
grandmother also moved to Illinois shortly before the suit was filed. In
Haley v. Haley96 a husband sued for divorce and managing conservatorship
of his children. The children had lived with their mother in Alaska for less
than six months at the time of the commencement of the suit. By the time of
the trial, however, they had lived in Alaska for longer than a year and a half,
and the trial court declined to exercise jurisdiction. The appellate court af-
firmed, finding that in custody litigation the interests of the children are
paramount.97
A New Mexico decision deserves special mention. In New Mexico ex rel.
Dep't of Human Services v. Avinger 98 the New Mexico Supreme Court held
that the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA)99 does not
preempt New Mexico's child neglect proceedings'0° because the PKPA is
silent on this subject and because the legislative history indicates that the
PKPA was intended to prevent child-snatching across state lines and not to
address child neglect issues.101 The court then found that under the New
Mexico UCCJAI0 2 the Texas court, which had rendered the original conser-
vatorship decrees, had continuing exclusive jurisdiction and the New Mexico
court should not have modified the Texas decrees.10 3 This case is important
because it clarifies the intent of Congress in child custody matters and points
out that the PKPA was not intended to resolve all custody problems.
The major purpose of the PKPA was, as the New Mexico court correctly
stated, to prevent child-snatching by providing a scheme that would em-
power only one state at a time to have jurisdiction to resolve child custody
matters. 104 It is possible, however, for two states to mistakenly issue con-
flicting child custody orders. Recently, when this has happened, parents
have turned to the federal courts to resolve the jurisdictional issue. 10 5
Hickey v. Baxter 10 6 is the most recent case in which a court has held that the
domestic relations exception does not apply to PKPA disputes and therefore
federal district courts do have the power to resolve the jurisdictional ques-
the state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived with the parents, a
parent, or a person acting as a parent, for at least six consecutive months. Special rules apply
for children less than six months old and for temporary absences. Id.
95. Id. at 341-43.
96. 713 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
97. Id. at 804.
98. 104 N.M. 255, 720 P.2d 290 (1986).
99. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
100. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-9 (1986).
101. 720 P.2d at 292.
102. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-10-15(A) (1986).
103. 720 P.2d at 294-95.
104. Id. at 292.
105. McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Heartfield v. Heartfield, 749
F.2d 1138 (5th Cir. 1985); Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1984).
106. 800 F.2d 430 (4th Cir. 1986).
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tions.107 Four circuits have now agreed on this issue.10 8 In Thompson v.
Thompson,10 9 however, the Ninth Circuit refused to follow the other cir-
cuits, declaring that since the PKPA does not expressly authorize a suit in
federal court to enforce its provisions it does not create a cause of action in
federal court.' 10 The court based its opinion on both the language of the
statute and its reading of the legislative history.I1 I A dissenting opinion dis-
puted the majority's interpretation of the legislative history, 12 claiming that
the majority's application of the statute left it unenforceable. 13 The United
States Supreme Court has decided to review Thompson 114 in order to resolve
the conflict in the circuits as to a private right of action in federal court
under the PKPA.
IV. SUPPORT
The most important non-event of the past year was the Texas Supreme
Court's promulgating and then rescinding child support guidelines.'1 5 The
guidelines were mandated by the legislature;1 16 they are under study again
and will be reissued by the court, presumably during 1987.
The legislature during the Second Called Session of the 69th Legislature
enacted a number of amendments to the child support and wage assignment
scheme, which had been enacted during the regular session in 1985.117
These changes were mandated by the federal Child Support Enforcement
Amendment of 1984,118 because, despite the efforts of the legislature, the
Texas scheme was not in compliance with the requirements of the federal
act. 119 The changes consisted of various methods for expediting the enforce-
ment and therefore the payment of support, and took effect January 1,
1987.120
Trial courts currently have wide discretion to establish the amount of sup-
port necessary in particular cases, and unless there has been an abuse of
discretion the appellate courts will not overturn their orders. 12 1 In the case
107. Id. at 431.
108. See supra notes 105 and 106.
109. 798 F.2d 1547 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3507 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1987)
(No. 86-964).
110. 798 F.2d at 1552.
111. Id. at 1553-58.
112. Id. at 1560-62.
113. Id. at 1562. The dissent stated the majority's application of the statute turned it into
"a toothless declaration of unenforceable platitudes." Id.
114. 55 U.S.L.W. 3507 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1987) (No. 86-964).
115. 23 TEX. LAW. Civ. DIG. # 26 (May 26, 1986) (rescinded July 16, 1986).
116. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.05 (a) (Vernon 1986).
117. See Solender, supra note 2, at 53-56.
118. P.L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305.
119. Unless Texas was in compliance with the provisions of the Act it is possible that
federal officials could impose monetary sanctions. 42 U.S.C. § 603(h) (Supp. III 1985).
120. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.05(e)(f), 14.31, .32, .41-.45, .61(b), .80-.86 (Vernon
Supp. 1987).
121. See Abrams v. Abrams, 713 S.W.2d 195, 196-97 (Tex. App.- Corpus Christi 1986,
no writ) (support order of $500 per child per month not an abuse of discretion, but periodic
increases in support was not supported by the evidence); Nelson v. Nelson, 713 S.W.2d 146,
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of Aguilar v. Barker,122 involving an involuntary paternity action, the appel-
late court affirmed the trial court's discretion not only to establish child sup-
port of $500 a month, but to award support retroactive to the date of
birth. 123 In this case, the mother had not specifically requested retroactive
support in her pleadings, but the appellate court affirmed the award, stating
that detailed pleadings are not required in suits affecting the parent-child
relationship. 124
In Huckeby v. Lawdermilk 125 the court approved an upward modification
of child support to $250 per month although an existing settlement agree-
ment provided for support of $100 per month. 126 The payor spouse con-
tended that the trial court erred in amending the contractual agreement
because the parties entered into it in accordance with the Family Code. 127
The appellate court held that what the trial court had modified was a sup-
port order and that to hold a court could not modify a support order because
of an existing support agreement would deny the court the power to act in
the child's interest. 128 The amount of modification of an award is within the
trial court's discretion, 129 but a court cannot allow a noncustodial parent to
claim children as dependents for income tax purposes when this would be
contrary to the Internal Revenue Code.' 30 A court lacks jurisdiction to
enter an extension of support order once the child has passed his eighteenth
birthday. 131
In Stubbs v. Stubbs 132 the father became delinquent in his support pay-
ments because, he contended, he no longer owed support since his daughter
had left her mother's home. The mother denied this and requested an as-
147 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1986, no writ) (per curiam) (support order of $300 per month
child support affirmed); Pharo v. Trice, 711 S.W.2d 282, 284 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no
writ) (requiring ex-wife to pay $500 per month child support not an abuse of discretion); Peery
v. Peery, 709 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ) (support award of less
than 25% of husband's income held reasonable); Conroy v. Conroy, 706 S.W.2d 745, 748 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1986, no writ) ($445 per month child support not an abuse of discretion where
father had income of $3,000-plus a month and mother had no income and had never worked
outside the home during the twenty-four years of marriage).
122. 699 S.W.2d 915 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no writ).
123. Id. at 917-18.
124. Id. at 917.
125. 709 S.W.2d 331 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, no writ).
126. Id. at 334.
127. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.06 (Vernon 1986) provides for agreements concerning
conservatorship.
128. 709 S.W.2d at 333.
129. See Gawlik v. Gawlik, 707 S.W.2d 256, 258-59 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, no
writ) (support raised from $50 per month per child to $75 per month per child, but trial court
could not establish arrearage at $3,000 when in actuality it should have been $12,000).
130. See Davis v. Fair, 707 S.W.2d 711, 718 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, no writ) (the
court did remand for a hearing on modification of support because of the hardship this ruling
might have on the payor).
131. See Attaway v. Attaway, 704 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1986, no
writ) (child must require continuous care and personal supervision because of mental or physi-
cal disability in order for support to be extended beyond the age of 18 years); Ex parte Boemer,
711 S.W.2d 406, 407 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ) (relator ordered released because trial
court had no jurisdiction to extend support order when modification requested after children
had turned 18).
132. 715 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
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signment of wages. The assignment was granted, although the daughter in
question was living with her maternal grandmother while attending school
in St. Louis, Missouri. The court pointed out that the temporary absence of
a child from home does not conclusively establish that she is no longer living
at home. 133 In Veterans Administration v. Kee 134 the children were not so
fortunate. The Texas Supreme Court held that because of federal preemp-
tion, the father's disability benefits received in exchange for his waiving all
his retirement benefits are not subject to garnishment for child support.135
In Madnick v. Doelling136 the appellate court found that the parties had
entered into a contractual agreement of support that was enforceable as a
contract although the support obligation had been modified downward over
the years.' 37 The support agreements were denominated as covenants, and
the children were designated as third-party beneficiaries who could enforce
the covenants. The appellate court found that this agreement was therefore
contractual. 138 In Ruhe v. Rowland 139 the court found a contract to sup-
port, and despite a subsequent downward modification of the judgment of
support, held that the court did not have the authority to modify the terms
of the support contract.140 The unpaid child support was therefore not dis-
charged in bankruptcy.
When a settlement agreement incorporates a specific amount of insurance
to remain in force and payable to the children of the insured, the insured
cannot thwart the agreement by converting the policy to two smaller policies
only one of which designates the children as the beneficiaries. '4' The chil-
dren remain entitled to the full amount, which would include both poli-
cies. 142 In Ayala v. Minniti,143 in connection with cross motions to modify
both conservatorship arrangements and support payments, the court entered
a temporary order to restrain the father or his attorneys from disposing of
any funds received in settlement of a pending lawsuit. The father appealed
the order, but since he had agreed to it, the court held that he was estopped
from challenging it. 144 The statute of limitations does not begin to run until
133. Id. at 375.
134. 706 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. 1986).
135. Id. at 102-03. The United States Supreme Court has noted probable jurisdiction of a
case coming from Tennessee in which the state court held, contrary to Texas, that it could
order the payment of child support from veteran's disability benefits. Rose v. Rose, 106 S. Ct.
3292, 92 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1986).
136. 713 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 1986, no writ).
137. Id. at 800.
138. Id.
139. 706 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
140. Id. at 710. It should be noted that these cases are distinguishable from Huckeby,
supra note 125 and accompanying text, in that Huckeby concerned an upward modification of
child support, thus the lesser contractual amount would not be affected by the court's
judgment.
141. See Alexander v. Alexander, 701 S.W.2d 48, 50-51 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (children entitled to proceeds of converted policy).
142. Id. at 51.
143. 714 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
144. Id. at 456-57.
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the date each separate payment is due; 145 thus an order reducing back sup-
port to judgment is not barred as to most of the payments although the
divorce decree was rendered more than ten years prior to the filing of the
suit for back child support. 146 A court may not retroactively modify down-
wards the amount of accrued child support 47 and should automatically re-
duce the back child support payments to judgment. Further, the court can
hold the respondent in contempt for only a portion of the amount in
arrears. 148
Sometimes when an obligor fails to pay child support, the obligee may ask
for an order of contempt. This request should be made in the trial court,
even though the case is on appeal. 149 If the order is not vague, the contem-
nor has not shown his inability to pay, and there is a specific writ, then
habeas corpus will not be granted.150 Good time credit should be granted to
contemnors who are being punished for failure to pay child support if other
county jail inmates receive such credit.15' To do otherwise would be a de-
nial of equal protection.15 2
Writs of habeas corpus will be granted when the order is void because it is
without support in the evidence,1 53 not specific enough, 154 or failure to com-
ply is because of inability to pay. 155 A punitive order will be considered void
if the time of commitment is increased without proper pleadings or notice to
the relator. 156 Once an order has been modified by a transferee court, then
the original court loses jurisdiction to enforce a support order. 157
V. TERMINATION AND ADOPTION
A decree that terminates the parent-child relationship divests the parent
and child of all legal rights with respect to each other. 158 The statutes con-
tain no provision for reversing a termination decree, so it must be rendered
in strict compliance with the law. 159 In order for the decree to be valid, the
145. See Grasberger v. Grasberger, 713 S.W.2d 429, 430-31 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1986 no writ) (limitations period runs from date each individual payment due).
146. Id.
147. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.08(c)(2) (Vernon 1986).
148. See Castillo v. Castillo, 714 S.W.2d 440, 442-43 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no
writ) (reversing trial court's reduction of child support to an amount less than owed under
child support order).
149. See Bivins v. Bivins, 709 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, no writ) (trial
court proper forum to seek enforcement of child support).
150. Ex Parte Glossen, 705 S.W.2d 711, 712-13 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no
writ); Ex Parte Williams, 704 S.W.2d 465, 467-69 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1986, no
writ); Ex Parte Jones, 700 S.W.2d 15, 18 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1985, no writ).
151. Ex Parte Acly, 711 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1986).
152. Id.
153. Ex Parte Davila, 30 Sup. Ct. J. 28, 29 (Oct. 25, 1986).
154. Ex Parte Griffin, 712 S.W.2d 214, 215-16 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ
dism'd).
155. Ex Parte Lopez, 710 S.W.2d 948, 954 ('Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, no writ).
156. Ex Parte Durham, 708 S.W.2d 536, 537-38 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
157. Ex Parte Owen, 701 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
158. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.07 (Vernon 1986).
159. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 370 (Tex. 1976) (termination of parent-child
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court rendering it must have proper jurisdiction, and if there have been prior
actions, it must be the court of continuing jurisdiction.1 ° The standard of
evidence for the termination of the parent-child relationship is clear and con-
vincing, and a trial court's decree will be reversed if the evidence is insuffi-
cient to meet the standard.16 1 In Clark v. Dearen 162 the court found that the
evidence was not clear and convincing and held that the father's rights could
not be terminated. 163 The mother had voluntarily relinquished her rights,
but the father had not. The trial court terminated both natural parents'
rights, the father's involuntarily, and granted a petition for adoption to ap-
pellees. The father appealed the decision, and the appellate court re-
versed. 164 While the decision appears correct on the law, the facts are most
unfortunate since the child has lived with the appellees since he was twenty-
two months old, is now seven, and has not seen his father since 1984.
Stewart v. Reese ' 65 addressed the problem of permitting a child's custody
to revert back to its natural mother if after relinquishment and placement
with adoptive parents, the mother changes her mind. This case concerned a
private adoption, and after the court had issued a decree of termination, but
before it became final, the mother revoked her relinquishment and filed a
motion to vacate the decree. The trial court denied the motion, and the
appellate court affirmed because the trial court had issued the decree on the
basis of an affidavit of relinquishment and the best interest of the child.166
The court held that permitting retroactive revocations of relinquishments
would encourage the snatching back of children "at the whim of the
parent."167
A termination of a father's parental rights will be sustained upon clear and
convincing evidence that the father has engaged in conduct endangering the
child. 168 In Clark v. Clark 169 the father had been convicted of murdering
the mother's two-and-a-half year old child by a previous marriage. The
mother thought the murder was an accident and married him. The father,
who is serving a twenty-eight year prison term, contested the termination,
claiming that since the murder had occurred prior to the birth of the child in
question, he had not endangered her. The court disagreed, finding that it
was not necessary for the violence to be committed in the presence of the
relationship may not be based solely upon what the trial court determines to be in the best
interest of child; one or more acts or omissions listed in statute must be proved).
160. Alexander v. Russell, 699 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. 1985).
161. Wetzel v. Wetzel, 715 S.W.2d 387, 388.89 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ) (di-
vorced father sought to terminate the rights of the natural mother, his ex-spouse, when she
brought an action for contempt to enforce her access rights).
162. 715 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ).
163. Id. at 366-67.
164. Id. at 368.
165. 698 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
166. Id. at 239-40.
167. Id. at 240 (citing Brown v. McLennan County Children's Protective Services, 627
S.W.2d 390, 394 (Tex. 1982)).
168. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.02(l)(E) (Vernon 1986) sets the requirement regarding
endangering the child.
169. 705 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ dism'd).
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child in order for the court to terminate parental rights.170 The court held
that there was sufficient proof that the father's uncontrollable temper would
endanger the child unless she was warned and that the warning itself would
cause the child emotional harm.' 7 '
Imprisonment and an underlying criminal record will not of themselves
constitute grounds for termination of parental rights, 172 and the bare asser-
tion that the father has voluntarily left the child without more evidence,
when the state has the ability to find evidence, pro or con on the point, will
not support a termination of parental rights. 173 If there is clear and convinc-
ing evidence, parental rights will be terminated, and the court's explanation
that termination prevents the authority to order visitation is not considered a
comment on the weight of evidence. 174 A mother who appeals her termina-
tion is required to file a motion to extend the period for filing a statement of
facts within seventy-five days of judgment even if she is indigent. 175 Requir-
ing her to comply with the rules is not a denial of due process or equal
protection. 176
In Byrne v. Catholic Charities, Diocese of San Angelo, Inc. 177 the court
sustained the rule that a relinquishment of parental rights to a licensed
agency is irrevocable 178 unless there is fraud or overreaching and that the
execution of the affidavit is proof that termination is in the best interest of
the child. 179 The child who was the subject of this suit is now in a position
to be adopted by strangers. In Cowet v. Brine180 a child who had been
adopted by strangers was the subject of a grandparent access suit. In this
case the adoptive parents divorced and the mother remarried. Shortly there-
after the adoptive father was killed. The mother of the adoptive father asked
for access rights, and the court denied them on the basis of the statute. 18
The problem is that the statute provides access only if a parent, at the time
permission is requested, is a natural parent.182 This result seems harsh in
light of the fact that the adoption decree is to have the effect of creating a
parent-child relationship as if the child had been born to the adoptive par-
170. Id. at 219.
171. Id.
172. See Boyd v. Texas Dep't Human Servs., 715 S.W.2d 711, 716 (Tex. App.-Austin
1986, no writ) (father's burglary conviction not enough to prove danger to child necessary to
sever parent-child relationship).
173. Texas Dep't of Human Res. v. J.T.H., 700 S.W.2d 718, 720-21 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1985, no writ).
174. See In re McElheney, 705 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, no writ)
(words of trial court did not comment on the weight of the evidence).
175. Howell v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit, 710 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tex. App.-Dal-
las 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
176. Id.
177. 710 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).
178. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 15.03(d) (Vernon 1986) states that an affidavit of relinquish-
ment to the Texas Department of Human Services (TDHS) or an agency authorized by the
TDHS is irrevocable.
179. 7101 S.W.2d at 783.
180. 704 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1985, writ dism'd).
181. Id. at 836.
182. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.03(e) (Vernon 1986).
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ents during marriage.1 83 Furthermore, the child is entitled to inherit from
his grandparents as if he were the natural child of his parents.1 84 Thus in
this case the child will have the legal right to inherit from his "grand-
mother" should she die intestate, 185 but she does not have the legal right to
visit him.
183. Id. § 16.09(a).
184. Id. § 16.09(b).
185. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 40 (Vernon 1980).
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